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A LARSON-ZUCKMAN CHECKLIST FOR PARTNERSHIP
TAX CLASSIFICATION OF ULPA REAL ESTATE SHELTERS
J. Durwood Felton, III*
I. INTRODUCTION
Real estate developments necessarily require large amounts of
capital, and are usually dependent on financing from sources other
than the venture group assembled to construct and operate a pro-
posed project. Theoretically, such ventures may be undertaken in
many forms, corporate and otherwise, and the available financing
vehicles may include debt instruments, equity shares and innumer-
able combinations thereof. In reality, however, business and legal
considerations often dictate organization and operation of such ven-
tures within more narrowly defined limits.
Traditionally, leveraged limited partnerships with sole corporate
general partners have provided a preferred balance of those factors
which are essential to the successful financing and operation of real
estate ventures. They perform the dual functions of providing ade-
quate yield, which is enhanced by tax-free cash distributions and
shelter of outside income sources of the participants, and of provid-
ing optimum leverage. Partnership status preserves the pass-
through of non-cash deduction items, such as depreciation, for the
individual partners' use in reducing the taxable component of cash
distributions and to shelter income from other sources. Properly
incurred partnership debt increases the partners' basis and provides
leverage. Under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA), I the
limited partners' risk is confined to their investment shares, unless
they take an active part in operating the enterprise. 2 Formation of
a sole corporate general partner insulates the organizers' indepen-
dent assets from exposure to liability, and electing taxation of the
sole corporate general partner under subchapter 5 of the Internal
* B.A., University of Richmond, 1967; J.D., 1971; ML&T, College of William and Mary,
1976; Attorney, Richmond, Virginia.
1. All states except Alabama, Kentucky, Louisiana and Wyoming have adopted the equiv-
alent of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-44 to -73 (Repl.
Vol. 1974).
2. UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT § 7, 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 582 (1969); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 50-50 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
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Revenue Code3 preserves the pass-through of non-cash deductibles
into the hands of the organizing venturers.
A threshold problem in the formation of a leveraged ULPA lim-
ited partnership with a sole corporate general partner is obtaining
assurance that it will be taxed as a partnership rather than as a
corporation. The importance of a correct determination can hardly
be overstated. Among other consequences, corporate status may
deprive the participants of the tax shelter originating in the pass-
through of depreciation and may subject income to taxation at two
levels rather than one.
For many years, the possibility that corporate tax status might
be asserted against real estate limited partnerships was regarded as
remote. Recently, however, as part of its more restrictive policy
toward tax shelters in general, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
has increasingly attempted to treat ULPA limited partnerships with
sole corporate general partners as corporations for federal income
tax purposes. Two significant recent cases have emerged from the
Internal Revenue Service's efforts. In Phillip G. Larson and
Zuckman v. United States,5 the Tax Court and the Court of Claims
respectively interpreted Treasury Regulations as precluding asso-
ciation classification of ULPA limited partnerships with sole corpo-
rate general partners. These decisions invite an examination of the
classification criteria under which such determinations are made
and permit tentative conclusions regarding the effect of commonly
used partnership provisions upon the tax classification of real estate
shelters.
HI. THE CLASSIFICATION REGULATIONS
The process of classifying an enterprise as a partnership involves
two types of determinations. The first determination is whether the
enterprise is a "partnership" as distinguished from an essentially
individualistic relationship such as co-ownership,l expense sharing,'
3. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 1371-79.
4. 66 T.C. 159 (1976); [1976 Transfer Binder] Tax Ct. Rep. (CCH) 33,793.
5. 524 F.2d 729 (Ct. C1. 1975).
6. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(a)(1976), requiring rendition of services in addition to co-
ownership; Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (1960).
7. See note 6 supra.
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pooling,' employer-employee,9 creditor-debtor,10 seller-purchaser,"
lessor-lessee' 2 or the like. The second determination is whether the
enterprise is a partnership or an "association" taxable as a corpora-
tion. Because the IRS has recently used the latter of these two
determinations as a primary weapon against real estate tax shelters,
the question of partnership versus corporate status has become the
more significant issue and is the issue which will be addressed in
this article.
The Internal Revenue Code twice defines a partnership to include
"a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated
organization, through or by means of which any business, financial
operation, or venture is carried on, and which is not a . . .trust,
estate or a corporation .... -13 The regulations" recite that this
definition is broader than the common law concept of partnership,
and that it may include groups not commonly called partnerships.
The Code defines the term "corporation" to include "associations,
joint-stock companies, and insurance companies."' 5
The skeletal statutory definition of partnership has been amply
augmented by the courts. The United States Supreme Court early
8. Luckey v. Commissioner, 334 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1964); Estate of Philip Landau, 21 T.C.
727 (1954), afl'd, 219 F.2d 278 (3d Cir. 1955); Rev. Rul. 54-68, 1954-1 C.B. 151.
9. See Estate of Craig Smith v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1963); Beck Chem.
Equip. Corp., 27 T.C. 840 (1957), acq. 1957-2 C.B. 3; Isadore Louis Rosenberg, 15 T.C. 1
(1950); Rev. Rul. 75-43, 1975-1 C.B. 383.
10. Claire Giannini Hoffman, 2 T.C. 1160 (1943), acq. 1944 C.B. 13, aff'd on other grounds
sub nom., Giannini v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 285 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 730
(1945).
11. Paul J. Kelly, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1090 (1970); Rupe v. United States, 1968-1 USTC
9179 (D.C. Neb. 1968); Edith W. Abrams, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 1501 (1961).
12. University Hill Foundation, 51 T.C. 548 (1969), rev'd, 446 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972); Haley v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1953), acq. 1952-
1 C.B. 2.
13. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7701(a)(2). A nearly identical definition appears in INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 761(a), which permits members of certain unincorporated associations to
elect exclusion from partnership status. The current, liberalized tax definition of a partner-
ship originated in the Revenue Act of 1932, the legislative history of which demonstrates the
congressional purpose to classify as a "partnership" any profit or loss sharing enterprise
requiring capital or services, which is not in the corporate or trust form. Questions regarding
the scope of the code definition, as compared with local law definitions, however, are more
apparent than real under modem statutes. While section 6(1) of the Uniform Partnership Act
adopts definitions and criteria similar to those of the code, the code definition prevails for
federal income tax purposes. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1965).
14. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-3 (1960); 1.761-1(a) (1976).
15. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7701(a)(3).
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recognized association and sharing of the consequences of the enter-
prise as primary partnership attributes, and classified the finding
as a question of fact to be determined by an objectively applied
test.'"
In a subsequent decision, however, the Court phrased the test of
partnership classification in terms of whether, on the facts, the par-
ties intended to associate for a business purpose. 17 Although no re-
quirement of subjective "intent" is evidenced by the language of the
statute,' this requirement has been so consistently recognized that
it is now firmly established. 9
The factors which distinguish partnerships from corporations for
tax purposes are set forth in the "association" regulations.' These
regulations were originally designed to complement the statutory
definition of "associations" and to prevent corporate tax classifica-
tion of unincorporated professional associations. They are popularly
called the "Kintner" regulations because they constitute the IRS's
reaction to a case of that name. 2' The IRS does not normally make
its determinations of partnership status of real estate shelters under
16. Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 286 (1946):
A partnership is generally said to be created when persons join together their money,
goods, labor, or skill for the purpose of carrying on a trade, profession, or business and
when there is community of interest in the profits and losses.
17. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
18. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7701(a)(3).
19. See, e.g., Adams v. United States, 328 F. Supp. 228 (D. Neb. 1971); Ray S. Robinson,
44 T.C. 20 (1965), acq. 1970-2 C.B. XXI; Hubert M. Luna, 42 T.C. 1067 (1964); Lucia Chase
Ewing, 20 T.C. 216 (1953), aff'd on other grounds, 213 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1954); Hubert F.
Baughn, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 1447 (1969).
In the foregoing cases, the courts have held that the requisite intent may be found from
the following objective factors:
(1) Joint contribution of capital or services for the purpose of carrying on a trade or
business and joint ownership of the capital contributions and earnings of the enter-
prise;
(2) Sharing of profits and losses;
(3) Mutual control of the business;
(4) The parties' agreement and their conduct pursuant thereto;
(5) Representations of partnership status to others;
(6) Separate books of account for the enterprise; and
(7) Holding title to the business property and conducting the business in a partner-
ship name.
20. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1965). The regulations are based on Morrissey v. Commis-
sioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935), with modifications originating primarily in subsequent cases.
21. United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
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the "partnership" regulations (which assume noncorporate status).
Rather, the determination is made by a negative application of the
"Kintner" regulations. These regulations list six major characteris-
tics ordinarily found in corporations, and state that an unincorpor-
ated organization will be classified as an association if it has more
corporate characteristics than non-corporate characteristics. 2
In determining the preponderance of characteristics, those com-
mon to both types of organizations are ignored.23 The regulations
conclude that corporate or partnership status will be determined on
the basis of four factors-continuity of life, centralization of man-
agement, liability for corporate debts being limited to corporate
property, and free transferability of interests.
An organization lacks continuity of life if it will dissolve upon the
"death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion
of any member. . . ."The regulations provide that an organization
does not have continuity of life if its existence after the withdrawal
of a member depends on an agreement by the remaining members
to continue in business .2  Even where the agreement provides for
continuation of the business in the event of the death or withdrawal
22. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3)(1965). The six "major corporate characteristics" of Reg-
ulation § 301.7701-2(a) are:
(1) Associates;
(2) An objective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom;
(3) Continuity of life;
(4) Centralization of management;
(5) Liability for corporate debts limited to corporate property; and
(6) Free transferability of interests.
The Regulations caution that the foregoing list is not exclusive, and that other factors may
be taken into account in a particular case. Treas. Reg. § 301-7701-2 (1965) does not specify
what "other factors" might be relevant in a given case. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S.
344 (1935), however, recognized that where other partnership and corporate characteristics
are equal, factors such as by-laws, minute books and the use of a corporate seal might be
relevant to corporate status. See also Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 C.B. 735; Rev. Proc. 74-17,
1974-1 C.B. 438. Query, whether in a case where other characteristics are equal, the absence
of such factors might be relevant to partnership status. See Phillip G. Larson, 66 T.C. 159
(1976), where in his concurring opinion, Judge Dawson eloquently points out the dangers of
using "other factors," which introduce a further element of subjectivity among otherwise
objective criteria.
23. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3)(1965). "Associates" and "an objective to carry on busi-
ness and divide the gains therefrom" fall within this category, being recognized as partnership
attributes as early as Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946) and Commissioner v.
Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
24. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1)(1965), citing Glensder Textile Co., 46 B.T.A. 176 (1942),
acq. 1942-1 C.B. 8.
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of a partner, the regulations provide that an enterprise only has
continuity of life if under local law, death or withdrawal does not
cause a dissolution notwithstanding the agreement. 2 The regula-
tions state categorically that a general or limited partnership sub-
ject to a statute corresponding to the Uniform Partnership Act or
the Uniform Limited Partnership Act lacks the corporate attribute
of continuity of life. 6
The courts have not taken the same view of the effect of dissolu-
tion under local law as that expressed by the regulations. In United
States v. Kintner,27 a group of doctors dissolved their partnership,
formed under the Montana version of the Uniform Partnership Act,
and executed "Articles of Association." The articles provided that
the organization would continue upon the death of the last survivor,
and that death or retirement of a member would not result in disso-
lution. Montana law prohibited corporate medical practice. Despite
a finding that the organization was probably a partnership under
Montana law, with the result that any member had the power to
dissolve it, the Ninth Circuit held that the medical clinic had conti-
nuity of life and was classifiable as a corporation for federal income
tax purposes. On similar facts, other cases have taken a similar
view. 21
The regulations provide that centralized management exists if
any person or persons have "continuing and exclusive authority" to
make business decisions for the organization without ratification by
its members.29 Such authority is usually indicated by the powers
granted to the management group. There is no centralized manage-
ment if the management group can perform only ministerial acts as
agent for the participants. Centralized management implies man-
agement in a representative capacity. This attribute has been found
lacking where the managers acted in their own capacity as partners,
and where they could not be removed by the limited partners.3 0 As
in the case of continuity of life, the regulations take a favorable view
25. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(2) and (3) (1965).
26. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(3) (1965).
27. 216 F.2d. 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
28. See, e.g., Foreman v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1964); Galt v. United
States, 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
29. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (1965).
30. Glensder Textile Co., 46 B.T.A. 176 (1942), acq. 1942-1 C.B. 8.
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of the centralized management requirement, especially as it applies
to entities created under ULPA. On the basis of the position that
an organization lacks centralized management if any member who
is not a member of the management group can bind the organization
as far as outsiders are concerned," the regulations state that a Uni-
form Partnership Act general partnership "cannot achieve effective
centralization of management" even on the basis of an agreement
among the partners. 2 A slightly more restrictive conclusion is
reached respecting limited partnerships under the ULPA. The regu-
lations state that while a limited partnership generally does not
have centralized management, this attribute may exist if the lim-
ited partners own "substantially all" the interests in the partner-
ship.3
The "substantially all" concept is not peculiar to the issue of
centralized management. The regulations provide that the corpo-
rate attribute of free transferability exists when members who own
"substantially all" the interests can transfer all their membership
rights to non-members without the consent of other members and
without effecting dissolution under local law.34 A right to transfer to
non-members only after the interests are offered to members is a
modified form of free transferability. In this situation, however, the
regulations provide that the characteristic of free transferability will
be accorded less weight than in the case of an unrestricted exercise. 5
Absence of a provision regarding transfer is not conclusive if trans-
fers have been, or could have been, made.36 This attribute has also
been recognized where transfer could be accomplished indirectly,
such as through the withdrawal and entry of members.
3 7
31. Section 9 of the UPA permits a partner to bind the partnership in such a situation when
dealing with a person who does not know of any prohibiting provision in the partnership
agreement.
32. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4)(1965).
33. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4)(1965), following Glensder Textile Co.,. 46 B.T.A. 176
(1942), acq. 1942-1 C.B. 8.
34. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1965).
35. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(2) (1965); see Frank B. Killiam, Trustee, 11 T.C.M. (P-H)
79 (1942).
36. Del Mar Addition v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1940); Hoersting Family
Trust, 14 T.C.M. (P-H) 885 (1945).
37. Schroeder Employees Thrift Club, 36 B.T.A. 645 (1937); Investment Trust of Mutual
Investment Co., 27 B.T.A. 1322 (1933), aff'd, 71 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1934).
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The regulations38 provide that an organization possesses the cor-
porate attribute of limited liability if, under local law, no member
is personally liable for organization debts in excess of organization
assets. The regulations recognize that limited liability does not exist
in the case of a general partnership formed under the ULPA or its
equivalent.3 A general partner in a limited partnership subject to a
state statute corresponding to the ULPA bears unlimited liability
unless:
(1) it does not have substantial assets other than its partnership
interest, which can be reached by the organization's creditors, and
(2) it is merely a "dummy" acting as an agent of the limited part-
ners.40
The "Kintner" regulations pose definite hazards to the tax classi-
fication of real estate limited partnerships formed under the ULPA
or its equivalent. Under applicable provisions these partnerships
will lack continuity of life. They lack centralized management un-
less substantially all the partnership interests are owned by the
limited partners. Limited liability requires the existence of a general
partner without substantial assets (other than his partnership inter-
est) that can be reached by creditors, and it further depends on
whether the general partner is merely a "dummy" acting as agent
of the limited partners. Free transferability of interest exists when
the owners of substantially all the interests can transfer them with-
out the consent of the remaining partners. Given these circumstan-
ces, many situations exist in which advance rulings on partnership
status are desirable.
III. ADVANCE RULING REQUIREMENTS
Although tax shelters in real estate have been utilized with more
or less frequency since the 1960's, they have only attracted signifi-
cant audit attention from the national office in the last several
38. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(1965).
39. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(1)(1965).
40. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(2)(1974); cf. Glensder Textile Co., 46 B.T.A. 176 (1942),
acq. 1942-1 C.B. 8, wherein the court phrased a similar test of limited liability in a ULPA
limited partnership in the disjunctive rather than in the conjunctive.
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years.4 Because proper tax classification of such enterprises is a
practical necessity, the IRS's leverage in requiring compliance with
its criteria is substantial.4 2
The IRS has established the following prerequisites to an advance
ruling on the partnership classification of a limited partnership with
a sole corporate general partner:
(1) The limited partners may not own, directly or indirectly, indi-
vidually or in aggregate, more than 20 percent of the stock of the
corporate general partner or its affiliates, either individually or by
attribution. 3
(2) If the corporate general partner has an interest in only one lim-
ited partnership and the total contributions to that partnership are
less than $2,500,000, the net worth of the corporate general partner
at all times will be at least 15 percent of such total contributions or
$250,000, whichever is the lesser. If total contributions to the partner-
ship are $2,500,000 or more, the net worth of the corporate general
partner, at all times must be at least 10 percent of such total contri-
butions. In computing net worth, the corporation's interest in the
limited partnership, certain receivables and payables are excluded.4
(3) The purchase of a limited partnership interest must not entail
either a mandatory or discretionary purchase, or option to purchase,
of any type of security of the corporate general partner or its affili-
ates. 5
The organization and operation of the limited partnership must be
in accordance with the applicable state statute relating to limited
partnerships." Additionally, if the corporate general partner has
41. In 1972, the IRS promulgated criteria for advance rulings on limited partnerships with
sole corporate general partners. Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 C.B. 735. In November 1973, Com-
missioner Alexander publicly announced the IRS's intention to increase audit and advance
ruling activity relating to tax shelters. 749 CCH $ 6257 (Nov. 11, 1973). Further requirements
for tax classification of real estate shelters as partnerships were announced in 1974, Rev. Proc.
74-18, 1974-1 C.B. 439, and 1975, Rev. Proc. 75-16, 1975-1 C.B. 676.
42. The IRS takes the position that these criteria are procedural rather than substantive.
See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1 C.B. 438. Failure or inability to satisfy these rules, however,
may be a material fact which should be disclosed to potential investors under whatever
disclosure documents might be required, and the risk remains that the Service will use the
criteria substantively in the event of an audit.
43. Rev. Proc. 72-13 § 2.01, 1972-1 C.B. 735.
44. Id. § 2.02.
45. Id. § 2.05.
46. Id. § 2.06.
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interests in more than one limited partnership, the net worth re-
quirements are applied separately and cumulatively to each limited
partnership .47 For purposes of computing the net worth of the corpo-
rate general partner, the current fair market value of the corporate
assets must be used.48
The IRS has established three additional guidelines which must
be met before it will consider ruling that a limited partnership con-
stitutes a partnership for federal income tax purposes." These cri-
teria, which apply to all limited partnerships, not just those with
sole corporate general partners, are as follows:
(1) At all times, the aggregate percentage interest of all general
partners, as general partners, in each material item of partnership
income, gain, loss, deduction or credit must be at least 1 percent.,
(2) The aggregate amounts to be deducted by the partners as their
distributive shares of partnership losses for the first two years of
operation must not exceed the amount of equity capital invested in
the partnership."
(3) A creditor who makes a nonrecourse loan to the partnership
cannot have or acquire, at any time as a result of making the loan,
any direct or indirect interest in the profits, capital or property of the
partnership (excluding a security interest in partnership property) .1
The IRS has promulgated a checklist of documents and other
information to be submitted with a ruling request concerning the
tax classification of an enterprise as a partnership. 3 Generally, the
required documents include the partnership agreement, the part-
nership certificate, the registration statement or its substitute, and
a copy of the promotional material relating to the enterprise. Addi-
tional required information includes disclosures respecting state
partnership law, the net worth of all general partners, a description
of creditors' interests and benefits, disclosures of capital contribu-
tions, an explanation of the participation of each partner in profits
47. Id. § 2.03.
48. Id. § 2.04.
49. Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1 C.B. 438.
50. Id. § 3.01.
51. Id. § 3.02.
52. Id. § 3.03.
53. Rev. Proc. 75-16, 1975-1 C.B. 676.
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and losses, and disclosures relating to negative capital accounts and
partnership distributions.
Many unresolved questions are raised by the criteria established
by the IRS.54 The disclosure requirements compound the question
whether to seek a formal advance ruling on partnership classifica-
tion. 5 The courts, however, have not taken as narrow a view of
partnership classification as has the IRS.
IV. THE LARSON AND ZUCKMAN DECISIONS
As part of its stepped up activity against real estate shelters, the
Internal Revenue Service early began scrutinizing ULPA limited
partnerships with sole corporate general partners for compliance
with the "Kintner" regulations. Among the objects of its analysis
were three more or less conventional limited partnerships with sole
corporate general partners.-6 In each case, the IRS took the position
that the enterprise more closely resembled a corporation than a
partnership. In each instance, the taxpayer litigated the issue and
prevailed. Larson57 involved two California syndications, Mai-Kai
and Somis, whose sole corporate general partner, GHL, was formed
primarily to organize and manage the two ventures. Upon the for-
mation of Mai-Kai, GHL, as general partner, contributed the right
to acquire the partnership real property. GHL was not required to
make any further capital contributions to Mai-Kai, and its initial
capital contribution was carried at zero on the partnership's books.
Purchase of apartments was accomplished with partnership capital
and a nonrecourse loan secured by a deed of trust on the apart-
ments.
For its contribution, GHL obtained a 20% interest in cash flow
and profits which was subordinated until the limited partners re-
54. Although a detailed analysis of Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 C.B. 735, and Rev. Proc. 74-
17, 1974-1 C.B. 438, is beyond the scope of this article, see BNA TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIOS
2D, PARTNERSHIPS-STATUTORY OUTLINE AND DEFINITION, 28-37 (1975), for a discussion of some
of the problems presented.
55. Among counsel's concerns in disclosing the information requested by Rev. Proc. 75-16,
1975-1 C.B. 676, is the possibility that the IRS will use personal net worth and other data on
the partners in connection with separate audit activities.
56. These partnerships were formed pursuant to CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 15501 et seq. (West
Supp. 1976) and Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 359.010 et seq. (Vernon 1976).
57. 66 T.C. 159 (1976); see note 4 supra, and accompanying text.
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covered their initial investment. Losses were allocated among all
partners according to their capital contributions. The Mai-Kai
agreement prohibited assignment of partnership interest without
the consent of the general partner, whose consent could not be un-
reasonably withheld. In order to transfer his capital interest at less
than fair market value, a limited partner was required to offer it first
to the other limited partners under a procedure specified in the
agreement. Bankruptcy of GHL would dissolve the partnership.
Somis was set up in a manner similar to Mai-Kai. No limited part-
ner in either Somis or Mai-Kai was a stockholder in GHL, except
one 23% owner of GHL, who held less than a 2% interest in Somis.
Zuckman v. United States58 presented facts similar to those in-
volved in the Larson case. In Zuckman, the parties formed a Mis-
souri limited partnership called Towne House, to acquire land, and
construct and operate an apartment project. The sole corporate gen-
eral partner, Forest Park, was a wholly-owned subsidiary of another
corporation which was wholly owned by Kanter, one of the Towni
House limited partners. Forest Park was capitalized at only five
hundred dollars, had no substantial assets other than its interest as
general partner in Towne House, and was engaged in no other activi-
ties. Kanter held a 21% limited partnership interest in Towne
House, and held a continuing proxy to vote all the stock of its
general partner, Forest Park.
Forest Park owned a 61% interest in the Towne House venture.
The venture was initially financed with a non-recourse FHA loan,
but subsequent refinancing resulted in an assumption of part of the
partnership's liability by Forest Park's parent corporation. The fi-
nancing documents included an agreement prohibiting dissolution
of the partnership without FHA consent.
For the taxable years in question, all three partnerships generated
losses which were passed through and deducted by the limited part-
ners on their individual returns. The IRS disallowed these deduc-
tions on the theory that Mai-Kai, Somis and Towne House more
closely resembled corporations, and assessed deficiencies. The Mai-
Kai and Somis taxpayers contested their deficiencies in the Tax
Court, while the Towne House taxpayers paid the tax and sought a
58. 524 F.2d 729 (Ct. C1. 1975); see note 5 supra, and accompanying text.
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refund in the Court of Claims. Both courts treated the "Kintner"
regulations as controlling, and held for the taxpayers, finding that
the enterprises were partnerships within the definition of the regula-
tions. Inso doing the Tax Court withdrew an earlier Larson opinion 9
holding otherwise, which, during its brief tenure, had created much
concern over the partnership classification of limited real estate
ventures with sole corporate general partners.
Both courts found the corporate characteristic of continuity of life
lacking in the partnerships under consideration. The Tax Court
found centralized management in Larson, but the Court of Claims
found it absent in Zuckman. Neither court found limited liability,
and only the Tax Court found corporate free transferability of inter-
ests. The Larson and Zuckman decisions indicate that, under the
existing "Kintner" regulations, there remains relatively little risk of
corporate classification for conventional ULPA limited partnerships
with sole corporate general partners, although the risk is probably
greater in the Tax Court than in the Court of Claims.
Both Larson and Zuckman recognize that the characteristics of
"associates" and "profitable objective""0 apply to both enterprises,
and both opinions, for reasons of predictability, apply the remaining
four characteristics of corporate resemblance on a mechanical,
equal-weight basis. The Tax Court, however, indicated that if it
could weigh each factor according to the degree of corporate similar-
ity it provides, it would be "inclined to find" that the involved
entities were taxable as corporations.
Through application of the "Kintner" regulations to concrete pro-
visions of the ULPA and the agreements promulgated thereunder,
Larson and Zuckman provide valuable insight into the present sta-
tus of the classification problem. The important conclusions are
summarized in the checklist appended hereto. A more detailed
analysis of these conclusions follows.
A. Continuity of Life
In Larson and Zuckman both the Tax Court and the Court of
Claims found the corporate characteristic of continuity of life lack-
59. 65 T.C. No. 10 (Nov. 14, 1975).
60. See note 22 supra.
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ing.11 The regulations specifically provide that there is no continuity
of life in the case of ULPA limited partnerships.12 The gravamen of
the inquiry involves the effect of bankruptcy or other disability of
the general partner upon the partnership. Under the regulations, if
bankruptcy of any partner causes dissolution of the enterprise, the
venture avoids the corporate characteristic of continuity of life.83
Thus, since under the California version of ULPA a partnership is
dissolved upon the bankruptcy of a partner, the Larson court held
that Mai-Kai and Somis lacked the corporate characteristic of con-
tinuity of life. 4
Initially, Larson's lesson respecting bankruptcy of the general
partner appears clear. If under the applicable version of the ULPA,
bankruptcy causes dissolution of the partnership, the enterprise
lacks the corporate characteristic of continuity of life. Zuckman
adopts the same view. 5 For planning purposes, however, several
distinctions and refinements must be made. First, in order to pro-
mote partnership status, the general partner's bankruptcy (or other
disability) should actually cause dissolution of the partnership, and
not merely confer on the remaining partners the right of dissolution.
Zuckman held irrelevant the fact that the general partner, by fi-
nancing agreement or otherwise, relinquishes its right to dissolution
as opposed to its power of dissolution.6 Secondly, the reservation,
in the remaining partners, of a right to replace a disabled general
partner or to continue the enterprise in the event of dissolution,
constitutes only a "contingent continuity of existence" which is
insufficient to meet the corporate standard. Third, if attempts by
61. See notes 4 & 5 supra.
62. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(3)(1965).
63. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1)(1965).
64. We hold that the partnerships involved herein do not satisfy the "continuity of
life" test as set forth in respondent's regulations. We recognize that our application of
respondent's existing regulations to the event of bankruptcy results in a situation
where it is unlikely that a limited partnership will ever satisfy the "continuity of life"
requirement of those regulations. But the fact that the regulations are so clearly keyed
to "dissolution" (a term encompasssing the legal relationships between the partners)
rather than the "termination of the business" (a phrase capable of more pragmatic
interpretation encompassing the life of the business enterprise) leaves us with no viable
alternative.
66 T.C. 175 (footnotes omitted).
65. 524 F.2d at 737.
66. Id.
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the partners to contract against dissolution in the event of the gen-
eral partner's bankruptcy are invalid under local law, such attempts
do not affect the partnership's tax status. In this regard Larson and
Zuckman require verification that the applicable version of ULPA
causes dissolution of the partnership in the event of bankruptcy or
other disability of the general partner, and they provide that this
fact alone destroys the corporate characteristic of continuity of life. 7
However, the cases further hold that provisions such as the relin-
quishment of a general partner's right to voluntarily file for bank-
ruptcy, or a reservation of the right in other partners to continue the
enterprise upon such dissolution, do not impair this aspect of part-
nership status.68
B. Centralization of Management
Larson and Zuckman provide an unusual opportunity for analysis
of the corporate characteristic of centralized management because,
applying the same principles to similar facts, the Tax Court found
this characteristic present,69 and the Court of Claims found it lack-
ing.7" These different results are explainable on the basis of factual
differences relating to the partnerships' agreements and activities.
Both cases recognize that centralized management, of the type
characteristic of corporations, is management in a representative
capacity, and that it is lacking in ULPA limited partnerships unless
"substantially all" the interests in the partnership are owned by the
limited partners. Both cases apply the "substantially all" test to
determine the existence of centralized management under the
stated facts.
In Larson, the general partner, GHL, obtained a 20% interest in
cash flow and profits, which was subordinated until the limited
partners recovered their initial investment. The petitioners had
failed to show, furthermore, that GHL's capital interests had any
present value during the years in issue. Given the limited partners'
power to remove GHL as general partner, the Tax Court reasoned
that GHL's right to participate in future growth and profits was
67. Larson, 66 T.C. at 176; Zuckman, 524 F.2d at 735.
68. Larson, 66 T.C. at 176; Zuckman, 524 F.2d at 736.
69. 66 T.C. at 176-79.
70. 524 F.2d at 739.
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wholly contingent on satisfactory performance of its management
role. The court concluded, therefore, that GHL's interest was "not
at all analogous to the independent proprietary interest of a typical
general partner,"7 and held that Mai-Kai and Somis possessed the
corporate characteristic of centralized management.
The Larson holding is perhaps best explained as an example of
evidentiary failure, coupled with an unusually contingent method
of compensating a general partner. Under a more vigorous analysis,
however, the Tax Court's holding raises a number of questions re-
garding more or less standard provisions which appear in ULPA
limited partnership agreements. First, the court does not specify
how much weight it will accord the fact that the general partner's
income interest is subordinated, or its conclusion that the general
partner's capital interest has no proven present value. How would
the court classify an agreement providing only for subordination of
income, or providing only for a contingent capital interest? Hope-
fully, the Tax Court would not hold, as a matter of law, that a
provision subordinating a general partner's interest in profits until
the limited partners recover their initial investment creates central-
ized management. Such provisions are commonplace in limited
partnership agreements. Since the court specifically distinguished
GHL's interest from the independent proprietary interest of a typi-
cal general partner,73 it is unlikely that mere subordination, without
more, would result in a finding of centralized management.
Second, if GHL's capital interest is so uncertain that it does not
merit consideration as a "meaningful proprietary interest, ' 7 what
capital interest would merit such consideration? Two related as-
pects of a general partner's capital interest are relevant. The first
is its defeasible nature, and the second is its lack of proven present
value. In Larson, the Tax Court first appears to say that the mere
power in the limited partners to remove the general partner deprives
the general partner of a "meaningful proprietary interest" as a mat-
ter of law.75 The court bolsters this conclusion with its finding that
71. 66 T.C. at 178.
72. Id. at 179.
73. Id. at 178.
74. Id. at 177.
75. Id.
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such removal is not required." Given such a finding on the issue of
removal of the general partner, it would become very difficult, if not
impossible, to satisfy the court on the issue of centralized manage-
ment. Such a holding would diminish to insignificance the peti-
tioner's failure to prove present value, which the court assigned as
an alternative reason for its finding of centralized management.7
It is important to recognize, however, that the court does not
ascribe corporate, centralized management to all limited partner-
ships in which the limited partners have the power to remove the
general partners from their management role. Rather, the court
indicates that centralized management exists if the general part-
ner's present capital interest can be defeased by such a removal. 8
Larson's lesson, as it applies to the capital interests of general part-
ners, is that these interests must be specifically, initially, and inde-
feasibly vested under the agreement, and not conditioned on satis-
factory future management performance or the power to remove the
general partner. Presumably, a right of removal involving a market
value buy-out of the expelled general partner's capital interest
would not violate this requirement.
An interesting aspect of Larson is that, although the issue of
centralized management turned entirely on the concept of owner-
ship of "substantially all" the partnership interests by the limited
partners, the court made no effort to quantify "substantially all."
In Zuckman, however, the court discussed the "substantially all"
requirement in the context of free transferability of interests. The
court held that 61% of the partnership's interests would not consti-
tute "substantially all," but suggested that 90% would suffice. 9 It
is believed that an accurate analogy may be drawn to the central-
ized management issue, and that therefore a general partner's reten-
tion of an indefeasible 39% interest in the partnership would effec-
tively prevent a finding of the corporate characteristic of centralized
management. A retention of between 10 and 39% is subject to ques-
tion, while retention of less than 10% is probably insufficient.
76. Id. at 178-79.
77. See 66 T.C. at 177-78.
78. Id. at 178.
79. 524 F.2d at 742 n.14.
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C. Limited Liability
The regulations provide that an organization has the corporate
characteristic of limited liability if, under local law, no member is
personally liable for debts of, or claims against the organization."0
Since in the case of limited partnerships, such liability ordinarily
exists with respect to the general partner, the corporate characteris-
tic of limited liability is lacking. Many limited partnerships, how-
ever, attempt to circumvent the general partner's liability by incor-
porating a thinly capitalized sole corporate general partner whose
assets are insufficient to meet foreseeable debts and claims, but
which, in theory at least, is fully liable for them. The anticipated
result is an enterprise with the tax advantages of a limited partner-
ship, but with limited liability approaching that found in the pure
corporate business form. The regulations attempt to limit such
abuses of the partnership form by establishing a two-pronged test
of the general partner's limited liability:
In the case of an organization formed as a limited partnership,
personal liability does not exist, for purposes of this paragraph, with
respect to a general partner when he has no substantial assets (other
than his interest in the partnership) which could be reached by a
creditor of the organization and when he is merely a "dummy" acting
as the agent of the limited partners.'
Although the regulations attribute this dual concept to Glensder
Textile Co.,8" the Glensder court phrased a single test of substantial
assets as follows:
If, for instance, the general partners were not men with substantial
assets risked in the business, but were mere dummies without real
means acting as the agents of the limited partners . . . there would
be something approaching the corporate form of stockholders and
directors 83
A comparison of the language of Glensder with that of the regula-
80. Treas. Regs. § 301.7701-2(d)(1).
81. Treas. Regs. § 301.7701-2(d)(2).
82. 46 B.T.A. 176 (1942), acq. 1942-1 C.B. 8.
83. Id. at 183.
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tions indicates that the Glensder court viewed "dummy" status as
"equivalent to" not risking substantial assets in the business, while
the IRS intended to establish "dummy" status as a separate crite-
rion of limited liability, unrelated to the risk of substantial assets.
In order to find the corporate characteristic of limited liability, both
Larson and Zuckman require that the separate tests of insubstantial
asset risk and "dummy" status be satisfied.84 Larson suggests sev-
eral factors which are consistent with "dummy" status:
(1) total control of the general partner by the limited partners,(2) power, in the limited partners, to direct the business activity
through the general partners,
(3) use of the general partner as a screen to conceal the limited
partners' active involvement in the conduct of the business; and,
(4) the general partner acting as a "rubber stamp" for the actions
of the limited partners."
All of the foregoing factors contemplate that the general partner
will act as agent for one or more limited partners who control the
partnership. In making a determination of "dummy" status of the
sole corporate general partner, the Larson court took a more liberal
view of the limited partners' right to remove the general partner
than it did in the context of centralized management. The court
held that the power of removal only gave the limited partners a
measure of control over their investment, without involving them in
the control of the business. 6 The right of removal, therefore, was
held not determinative of "dummy" status.
Zuckman raises an intriguing possibility respecting limited part-
ners who take part in control of the business. Since under the ULPA,
such limited partners themselves become liable as general partners,
the Zuckman court found only two alternatives: If the sole corporate
general partner is not a "dummy," it is liable for partnership debts,
and corporate limited liability does not exist.8" If the sole corporate
general partner is a "dummy," however, the limited partners from
whom it acts as agent are liable, and corporate limited liability still
84. Larson, 66 T.C. at 179-80; Zuckman, 524 F.2d at 741.
85. See 66 T.C. at 180-81.
86. Id.
87. 524 F.2d at 741.
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does not exist.88 The effect of this rationale is a finding that ULPA
limited partnership with sole corporate general partners lack the
corporate characteristic of limited liability as a matter of law. It
may make no tax difference whether the sole corporate general part-
ner or an individual limited partner bears unlimited liability, but
limited partners should not take part in control of the business such
that they become liable as general partners.
D. Free Transferability of Interests
Like centralized management, the corporate characteristic of free
transferability of interests provides an unusual opportunity for anal-
ysis because, on similar facts, Larson found it present and Zuckman
found it lacking.89 The regulations provide that this fourth major
corporate characteristic exists when the members owning substan-
tially all of the interests in the organization have the power, without
the consent of other members, to substitute non-members for them-
selves, and to confer upon their substitutes all the attributes of their
interests in the organization.
Larson and Zuckman provide only limited guidance as to what
constitutes "substantially all" the partnership interests. The con-
cept recurs in connection with centralized management, where the
limited partners' ownership of "substantially all" the partnership
interests is indicative of corporate status. In Larson, the Tax Court
held, without quantifying the concept, that the limited partners
owned substantially all the interests in Mai-Kai and Somis for pur-
poses of centralized management." When deciding the issue in the
context of free transferability, the court treated its prior determina-
tion as dispositive, thereby suggesting that the same test would
apply, regardless whether the determination is made for purposes
of centralized management of free transferability.2 In Zuckman,
however, the Court of Claims made a limited attempt to quantify
the concept, by holding that 61% interest is not substantially all,
and by suggesting that a 90% interest may be.13 Given the Tax
88. Id.
89. Larson, 66 T.C. at 184; Zuckman, 524 F.2d at 743.
90. Treas. Regs. § 301.7701-2(e)(1).
91. 66 T.C. at 182.
92. Id. at 184.
93. 524 F.2d at 742 n.14.
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Court's reliance on Zuckman in connection with the centralized
management issue, and its own treatment of centralized manage-
ment as dispositive of this aspect of free transferability, a persuasive
argument can be made for the acceptance of Zuckman's 61%-90%
test by the Tax Court.
The gravamen of the concept of free transferability is in the ques-
tion how much consent is required to effectuate a transfer of all the
rights and liabilities associated with a member's partnership status.
This issue was addressed in Larson, which found substantially all
the interests to be freely transferable,94 and also in Zuckman which
held the other way. 5 In Larson, the applicable uniform act required
consent of all members to effect a transfer of a limited partnership
interest,9 and the agreements provided that consent to a limited
partner's assignment of his income interest could not be unreason-
ably withheld. The Tax Court found that such a limited restriction
was not typical of partnership agreements and held that the limited
partner's income rights were freely transferable. The limited part-
ners' capital interests were similarly characterized, despite a re-
quirement that such interests be first offered to the other limited
partners before transfer to third parties. The court held that there
was no effort by the parties to select their business associates, as is
characteristic of the usual partnership arrangement.
Larson provides few clues to the concept of free transferability. It
holds that reasonable consent to a transfer of income interests is not
an attempt to select business associates which characterizes the
partnership form."9 ' It further holds that a requirement, that a lim-
ited partner offer his capital interests to the other members before
he transfers them for less than fair market value, does not destroy
free transferability."0 ' Both of these conclusions are understandable.
The benchmark of free transferability is a partner's power to trans-
fer his right to direct or control the enterprise to third parties with-
94. 66 T.C. at 183-84.
95. 524 F.2d at 743.
96. See 66 T.C. at 183.






UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
out affording his associates an opportunity to pass on the capabili-
ties or characteristics of his transferee. Reasonable consent to the
assignment of income rights, without more, does not constitute con-
trol of the enterprise. Consent to the transfer of capital interests
might impair free transferability, but on Larson's facts the remain-
ing partners had only the first right to acquire those interests in the
event of a transfer for less than fair market value. In sum, the court
found that an assignee for fair consideration of a limited partner's
interest in Somis or Mai-Kai could acquire all the rights of his
assignor, without discretionary consent of any other member. This,
the court reasoned, is free transferability of interests. '
Zuckman adopted a more mechanistic approach than the "effort
to select business associates" concept of Larson. In Zuckman, the
agreement required consent of the general partner before a limited
partner could substitute an assignee as a contributor or as a trans-
feree of his interest. '"3 One of the limited partners controlled the
general partner, and the court held that his interest was freely trans-
ferable.' 4 The general partner's interest, however, could only be
transferred with the consent of the limited partners, and the court
found this characteristic determinative that "substantially all" the
interests were not freely transferrable. °5
Larson and Zuckman suggest that the corporate characteristic of
free transferability may be avoided in several ways. If the general
partner owns at least 39% of the partnership, a requirement of the
limited partners' discretionary consent to a transfer of its interests
will defeat free transferability, regardless of how freely the limited
partners may transfer their shares. Conversely, a requirement of
discretionary consent of the remaining limited partners before
transfer of a limited partner's capital interests appears sufficient to
defeat free transferability if the limited partners own at least 39%.
Mere formal or procedural prerequisites will not suffice./
V. CONCLUSION
Larson and Zuckman constitute clear evidence that neither the
102. Id.
103. See 524 F.2d at 742.
104, Id. at 743.
105. Id.
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Tax Court nor the Court of Claims will permit the IRS to use its
"Kintner" regulations to destroy the partnership status of standard
ULPA limited partnerships with sole corporate general partners.
The risk remains greater under Larson than under Zuckman.
Zuckman found all four corporate characteristics lacking in a unani-
mous opinion. The Tax Court opinion in Larson found only the bare
minimum of two corporate characteristics lacking. Furthermore, the
Tax Court evidenced indecision by issuing the withdrawal of an
earlier contrary opinion and by the existence of five dissenting opin-
ions. Initially, practitioners may be pleased at a majority Tax Court
opinion holding in favor of partnership classification. Analysis of the
Larson opinion, its concurring opinions and dissents, however,
leaves unresolved the question whether Larson constitutes the Tax
Court's final view of these issues, and if so, how easily the IRS might
reverse this result by an invited amendment of the "Kintner" regu-
lations. The IRS is in the process of appealing Larson, and the
possibility of a reversal exists.
Both courts saluted the initial question of the applicability of the
"Kintner" regulations but treated them as dispositive because of
the parties' agreements to that effect. In each case the court admon-
ished the IRS for using these regulations for an unintended purpose.
The salient conclusions to be drawn from Larson and Zuckman
are appended to this article in the form of a checklist which counsel
may find useful when drafting limited partnership agreements.
Under the Larson and Zuckman decisions, the IRS is bound to
make two-way classification determinations under its "Kintner"
regulations, but the circumstances will be rare in which the IRS
succeeds in forcing corporate status upon ULPA limited partnership
with sole corporate general partners.
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Appendix
A Larson-Zuckman Checklist for
Partnership Tax Classification of
ULPA Limited Partnerships with Sole
Corporate General Partners
I. "Corporate" characteristics two or more of which must be
lacking in order to obtain partnership classification for federal in-
come tax purposes:
A. Continuity of Life
B. Centralized Management
C. Limited Liability
D. Free Transferability of Interests
II. Continuity of Life
A. Factors evidencing a lack of continuity of life, consistent with
partnership classification:
1. Bankruptcy or other disability of the general partner causes
dissolution of the partnership under applicable law or the part-
nership agreement (it does not merely confer a right to dissolve).
B. Factors evidencing the existence of continuity of life, consistent
with corporate classification:
1. Bankruptcy or other disability of the general partner does
not dissolve the partnership; or it confers the mere right to dis-
solve the partnership under applicable law and the agreement.
C. Nondispositive factors.
1. The agreement removes the right to voluntary dissolution,
but not the power of voluntary dissolution.
2. The remaining partners reserve the right to replace a dis-
abled general partner or to continue the enterprise in the event
of dissolution.
3. Attempts to contract against dissolution in the event of a
partner's disability, if such attempts are invalid under local law.
H. Centralized Management
A. Factors evidencing a lack of centralized management, consistent
with partnership classification.
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1. The general partner's authority to make decisions on behalf
of the partnership is not exercisable in a representative capacity
on behalf of limited partners, but in an individual capacity on
behalf of itself.
2. The limited partners do not own "substantially all" the
interests in the partnership (limited partners own 61% or less).
(a) Retention of a "meaningful proprietary interest" in
the partnership by the general partner.
(b) The general partner's income interest is not subordi-
nated to that of the limited partners.
(c) The general partner's capital interest has provable
present value.
(d) There is a reasonable expectation of future return to
the general partner as a result of its partnership interest.
(e) The general partner's right to participate in future
growth and profits is vested, regardless of future satisfac-
tory performance of its management role.
(f) The agreement prohibits, or narrowly restricts cir-
cumstances permitting removal of the general partner.
B. Factors evidencing centralized management, consistent with
corporate classification:
1. The general partner has continuing exclusive authority to
make independent business decisions in a representative capac-
ity, on behalf of the partnership.
2. "Substantially all" the interests in the partnership are
owned by the limited partners (90% or more).
(a) The general partner's income interest is subordinated
to that of the limited partners.
(b) The general partner's capital interest has little or no
present value.
(c) There is no reasonable expectation of future return to
the general partner as a result of its interest in the partner-
ship.
(d) The general partner's right to participate in future
growth and profits is contingent on satisfactory perform-
ance of its management role.
(e) The agreement provides for removal of the general
partner.
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IV. Limited Liability
A. Factors evidencing unlimited liability consistent with partner-
ship classification.
1. Unlimited liability of the sole corporate general partner.
2. The sole corporate general partner has substantial assets
other than its partnership interest.
3. The sole corporate general partner is not a "dummy" acting
as an agent for the limited partners.
4. Individual limited partners take part in control of the busi-
ness such that they are liable to third parties for partnership
debts under ULPA.
B. Factors evidencing limited liability consistent with corporate
classification.
1. The sole corporate general partner has no substantial assets
other than its partnership interest, and is a dummy acting as
the agent of the limited partners.
2. In the preceding situation, the limited partners do not take
part in control of the business such that they are liable to third
parties for partnership debts under ULPA.
V. Free Transferability of Interests
A. Factors evidencing lack of free transferability consistent with
partnership classification.
1. Less than "substantially all" the partnership interests are
freely transferable (61% or less are freely transferable).
2. Significant partnership interests (39% or more) are only
transferable with the discretionary consent of the remaining
partners.
B. Factors evidencing free transferability consistent with corporate
classification.
1. "Substantially all" the partnership interests are freely
transferable (90% or more).
2. Transfer does not require discretionary consent of the re-
maining partners.
C. Nondispositive factors.
1. Formal or procedural, rather than substantive, restrictions
on transfer of interests.
2. Requirement of first offer to other partners prior to transfer
for less than fair market value.
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